Exploitation and Mitigation:

Understanding Large-Scale Machine Learning Robustness under Paradigm Shift

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1. Introduction

Foundation Models

We generally called those large X models as **foundation models (FMs)**, which contain a rich general knowledge by pretraining on vast datasets and can be widely adapted to different use cases by fine-tuning



Image Credit to Bommasani et al.

Large Language Models (LLMs)

LLM is a machine learning model designed for natural language processing tasks such as language generation.

Structure-wise, it is made by many Transformer Blocks (E.g., GPT-3 has 96 transformer decoder blocks).



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Large Language Models (LLMs)

LLMs is first pretrained on the next word prediction prediction task on large-scale corpus. Usually, the training corpus are collected from the internet text



Next Word Prediction Task

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Large Language Models (LLMs)

After that, LLMs are finetuned on instruction-tuning tasks

This training task is performed on datasets of instruction-desired output pairs to improve its ability



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Large Language Models (LLMs)

LLMs are further trained with Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF)



Image Credit to Chip Huyen

Multi-Modal Large Language Models (MLLMs)



Based on LLMs, we can develop MLLMs in similar fashion, which is a combination of Vision Transformers and LLMs

Image Credit to Jian Li et al.

Multi-Modal Large Language Models (MLLMs)



The visual tokens and text tokens will be put to the LLM together for generating responses based on images and texts

Image Credit to Jian Li et al.

Multi-Modal Large Language Models (MLLMs)



The training of MLLM includes two stages: pre-training stage (e.g., image captioning) and instruction-tuning (e.g., visual question answering)

Image Credit to Jian Li et al.

Paradigm Shift Observation



Developing foundation models include two stages: pretraining a large network structure with a large training corpus with self-supervised learning task and fine-tuning the same structure on task-specific data with supervised learning

Image Credit to Jian Li et al.

Paradigm Shift Observation



Because of the good structure and large data, foundation models are more powerful in common machine learning tasks and have wide applications

Image Credit to Jian Li et al.

Today: Model Robustness

In addition to powerful performance and wide adoption, a good model is supposed to be robust. For example:

- The AI chatbot should not misunderstand us when we have a slight typo in my prompt
- The AI voice assistant should recognize us when we have a slight change in our voice

Image Credit to the Internet

Today: Adversarial Robustness

We are specifically interested in **adversarial robustness** in our tutorial today: the ability of a machine learning model to maintain its performance and predictions even when it is presented with adversarial examples



Image Credit to the Internet

Today: Model Robustness

With the example here, we want to investigate whether a given machine learning model will change its prediction when a small perturbation is added to the image



Image Credit to the Internet

Today: Model Robustness

Assumption: Even though the used model is deployed as a black box, because of the same structure used in pretraining and fine-tuning, models are more likely to be fooled



Image Credit to the Internet

Background: Image Adversarial Attack

Fast Gradient Sign Method (Goodfellow et al., 2014): Adding a small perturbation based on the loss gradient



Input | Noise | Perturbed Input

Image Credit to the Internet

Background: Image Adversarial Attack

Projected Gradient Descent Attack (Madry et al., 2017) improves FGSM attack by performing gradient ascent and projection operation iteratively



Image Credit to the Internet

Background: Text Adversarial Attack

In text adversarial attacks, attackers usually consider the question: Given a sentence with many words, and each word has a set of synonyms, how to construct a sentence by synonym substitution that makes the model output a different prediction?



Image Credit to the Internet

Background: Text Adversarial Attack

A representative method is called Bert-Attack. It includes two steps:

(1) finding the vulnerable words for the target model and then

(2) replacing them with the semantically similar and grammatically correct words until a successful attack



Image Credit to Linyang Li et al.

Background: Text Adversarial Attack

For step 1, it defines the importance of each word by the change of logits when a word is removed

For step 2, it uses BERT to generate suggestions for each selected replaced position and replace the original word with the suggestions



Image Credit to Linyang Li et al.

Limitation of Single-Modal Attack

The attacks used in previous setting are for one modality, they don't work perfectly in the new setting of foundation models



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2. Paradigm Shift in Test Time Model Robustness

Test-Time Attack for Foundation Models

In the real-world adversarial attack setting, since the target model of the service provider is generally a black box that only outputs prediction score and limits malicious access



Muchao Ye, Xiang Xu, Qin Zhang, and Jon Wu. 2024. Sharpness-aware optimization for real-world adversarial attacks for diverse compute platforms with enhanced transferability. In CVPR AdvML Workshop.

Attack Strategy 1: Utilizing Transferability

The attacker will (1) generate adversarial image through a known surrogate model and then (2) put the generated adversarial example to target model for attacking



Muchao Ye, Xiang Xu, Qin Zhang, and Jon Wu. 2024. Sharpness-aware optimization for real-world adversarial attacks for diverse compute platforms with enhanced transferability. In CVPR AdvML Workshop.

What should be a good attack?

We are finding similar inputs with slight perturbation from the original input and makes the feature misaligned, which triggers unwanted results (e.g., misclassification, unsafe response, ect.)



(a) multimodal embedding space (for fused VLP model) (b) unimodal embedding space (for aligned VLP model)

Jiaming Zhang, Qi Yi, and Jitao Sang. 2022. Towards Adversarial Attack on Vision-Language Pre-training Models. In ACM MM’22.

What should be a good attack?

Perturbing bi-modal inputs is stronger than perturbing any single-modal input. This utilizes the context from other modality. There is a 1 + 1 < 1 effect from attacking both modalities independently



(a) multimodal embedding space (for fused VLP model) (b) unimodal embedding space (for aligned VLP model)

Jiaming Zhang, Qi Yi, and Jitao Sang. 2022. Towards Adversarial Attack on Vision-Language Pre-training Models. In ACM MM'22.

VLAttack

Safety Threat: We can attack block-box downstream tasks using pre-trained vision-language models



Ziyi Yin, Muchao Ye, Tianrong Zhang, Tianyu Du, Jinguo Zhu, Han Liu, Jinghui Chen, Ting Wang, and Fenglong Ma. 2023. VLATTACK: Multimodal Adversarial Attacks on Vision-Language Tasks via Pre-trained Models. In NeurIPS '23.

VLAttack

Background: Nowadays, pretrained VLM are released to everyone, and people use it to train their own model in specific downstream tasks



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VLAttack

Attacks: Because of the same structure, VLAttack wants to attack the pretrained model and transfer it to every downstream task



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VLAttack

The attack idea is simple: given a pretrained model, first conduct an attack on image space to see if (adversarial image, original text) pair fools a fine-tuned model



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VLAttack

Attack Idea: given a pretrained model, first conduct an attack on image space to see if (adversarial image, original text) pair fools a fine-tuned model

Based on PGD attacks in the feature space of pre-trained model



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VLAttack

If not, fix the adversarial image, find an adversarial text and see if (adversarial image, adversarial text) pair fools a fine-tuned model

By some greedy text adversarial attack like BERT-Attack



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VLAttack

If it is still not working, based on the changed text, find another adversarial image to see if the new (adversarial image, adversarial text) pair fools a fine-tuned model



Change the text, do the image attack again

Ziyi Yin, Muchao Ye, Tianrong Zhang, Tianyu Du, Jinguo Zhu, Han Liu, Jinghui Chen, Ting Wang, and Fenglong Ma. 2023. VLATTACK: Multimodal Adversarial Attacks on Vision-Language Tasks via Pre-trained Models. In NeurIPS '23.

VLAttack

The found adversarial examples generalizes to different cases

Table 1: Comparison of VLATTACK with baselines on ViLT, Unitab, and OFA for different tasks, respectively. All results are displayed by ASR (%). B&A means the BERT-Attack approach.

Pre-trained Model	Task	Dataset	Image Only				Text Only		multimodality	
			DR	SSP	FDA	BSA	B&A	R&R	Co-Attack	VLATTACK
ViLT	VQA	VQAv2	23.89	50.36	29.27	65.20	17.24	8.69	35.13	**78.05**
	VR	NLVR2	21.58	35.13	22.60	52.17	32.18	24.82	42.04	**66.65**
BLIP	VQA	VQAv2	7.04	11.84	7.12	25.04	21.04	2.94	14.24	**48.78**
	VR	NLVR2	6.66	6.88	10.22	27.16	33.08	16.92	8.70	**52.66**
Unitab	VQA	VQAv2	22.88	33.67	41.80	48.40	14.20	5.48	33.87	**62.20**
	REC	RefCOCO	21.32	64.56	75.24	89.70	13.68	8.75	56.48	**93.52**
	REC	RefCOCO+	26.30	69.60	76.21	90.96	6.40	2.46	68.69	**93.40**
	REC	RefCOCOg	26.39	69.26	78.64	91.31	22.03	18.52	65.50	**95.61**
OFA	VQA	VQAv2	25.06	33.88	40.02	54.05	10.22	2.34	51.16	**78.82**
	VE	SNLI-VE	13.71	15.11	20.90	29.19	10.51	4.92	18.66	**41.78**
	REC	RefCOCO	11.60	16.00	27.06	40.82	13.15	7.64	32.04	**56.62**
	REC	RefCOCO+	16.58	22.28	33.26	46.44	4.66	7.04	45.28	**58.14**
	REC	RefCOCOg	16.39	24.80	33.22	54.63	19.23	15.13	30.53	**73.30**

Ziyi Yin, Muchao Ye, Tianrong Zhang, Tianyu Du, Jinguo Zhu, Han Liu, Jinghui Chen, Ting Wang, and Fenglong Ma. 2023. VLATTACK: Multimodal Adversarial Attacks on Vision-Language Tasks via Pre-trained Models. In NeurIPS '23.

VLAttack



Figure 8: Qualitative results of VLATTACK on (a) multimodal tasks and (b) Uni-modal tasks on OFA. Perturbed word tokens and original predictions are displayed in red and blue, respectively. We show the predictions after the adversarial attack with underline.

Ziyi Yin, Muchao Ye, Tianrong Zhang, Tianyu Du, Jinguo Zhu, Han Liu, Jinghui Chen, Ting Wang, and Fenglong Ma. 2023. VLATTACK: Multimodal Adversarial Attacks on Vision-Language Tasks via Pre-trained Models. In NeurIPS '23.

VLAttack



Figure 12: An adversarial image from BSA.



Figure 13: An adversarial sentence from text attack.



Figure 14: An adversarial image-text pair from multimodal attack.

Ziyi Yin, Muchao Ye, Tianrong Zhang, Tianyu Du, Jinguo Zhu, Han Liu, Jinghui Chen, Ting Wang, and Fenglong Ma. 2023. VLATTACK: Multimodal Adversarial Attacks on Vision-Language Tasks via Pre-trained Models. In NeurIPS '23.

VQAttack

This idea generally work for attacking in the paradigm shift: using a pre-trained multimodal source model to create adversarial image-text pairs and then transferring them to attack the target VQA models



Ziyi Yin, Muchao Ye, Tianrong Zhang, Jiaqi Wang, Han Liu, Jinghui Chen, Ting Wang, and Fenglong Ma. 2023. VQAttack: Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Visual Question Answering via Pre-trained Models. In AAAI '23.

Attack Strategy 2: Test-Time Adaptation

We can directly attack the model by using the model prediction as a feedback for crafting adversarial examples



Tong Wu, Feiran Jia, Xiangyu Qi, Jiachen T. Wang, Vikash Sehwag, Saeed Mahloujifar, and Prateek Mittal. 2023. Uncovering Adversarial Risks of Test-Time Adaptation. In ICML ’23.

Attack Strategy 2: Test-Time Adaptation

Algorithm 1 for constructing Distribution Invading Attack

1: **Input:** Pre-adapted model parameters $\theta^{\text{pre}} = \theta_{\mathcal{A}} \cup \theta_{\mathcal{B}} \cup \theta_{\mathcal{F}}$, test batch $(\mathbf{X}^t_B; \mathbf{y}^t_B)$ which contains malicious samples $\mathbf{X}^t_{mal}$ and benign samples $\mathbf{X}^t_{B \setminus mal}$, targeted samples $\mathbf{x}^t_{tgt}$ and incorrect targeted label $\dot{y}_{tgt}$, attack learning rates α, constraint ϵ, number of steps N, TTA update rate: η, perturbation $\boldsymbol{\delta_m}$=0

2: **Output:** Perturbed malicious input $\mathbf{X}^t_{mal} + \boldsymbol{\delta_m}$

3: **for** step $= 1, 2, \ldots, N$ **do**:

4: $\quad \mathbf{X}^t_B \leftarrow (\mathbf{X}^t_{mal} + \boldsymbol{\delta_m}) \cup \mathbf{X}^t_{B \setminus mal}$

5: $\quad \theta'_{\mathcal{B}} \leftarrow \{\mu(\mathbf{X}^t_B), \sigma^2(\mathbf{X}^t_B)\}$

6: $\quad$ (Optional) $\theta'_{\mathcal{A}} \leftarrow \theta_{\mathcal{A}} - \eta \cdot \partial \mathcal{L}_{\text{TTA}}(\mathbf{X}^t_B)/\partial \theta_{\mathcal{A}}$

 # $\theta'_{\mathcal{A}} \approx \theta_{\mathcal{A}}$ in the single-level version.

7: $\quad \theta^* \leftarrow \theta'_{\mathcal{A}} \cup \theta'_{\mathcal{B}} \cup \theta_{\mathcal{F}}$

8: $\quad \boldsymbol{\delta_m} \leftarrow \Pi_\epsilon (\boldsymbol{\delta_m} - \alpha \cdot \text{sign}(\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\delta_m}} \mathbb{L}(f(\cdot\, ; \theta^*(\mathbf{X}^t_B)))))$

 # $\mathbb{L}$ is chosen from Eq. (3), Eq. (4), or Eq. (5)

9: **end for**

10: **return** $\widehat{\mathbf{X}}^t_{mal} = \mathbf{X}^t_{mal} + \boldsymbol{\delta_m}$



Tong Wu, Feiran Jia, Xiangyu Qi, Jiachen T. Wang, Vikash Sehwag, Saeed Mahloujifar, and Prateek Mittal. 2023. Uncovering Adversarial Risks of Test-Time Adaptation. In ICML '23.

Defense for Test-Time Attack

The misbehavior is amended in the training side, which is usually conducted in the fine-tuning stage



Defense for Test-Time Attack

We usually have new regularization terms in the training loss to avoid the misbehavior



CaRot

CaRot is a method for improving the multi-modal large language model's performance in out-of-distribution (OOD) generalization



Changdae Oh, Hyesu Lim, Mijoo Kim, Dongyoon Han, Sangdoo Yun, Jaegul Choo, Alexander Hauptmann, Zhi-Qi Cheng, and Kyungwoo Song. 2024. Towards Calibrated Robust Fine-Tuning of Vision-Language Models. In NeurIPS '24.

CaRot

Training loss includes two parts: L_{MCL} and L_{SD}. L_{MCL} is a multimodal contrastive loss for the trained model, and L_{SD} is a calibration term for robust fine-tuning



Changdae Oh, Hyesu Lim, Mijoo Kim, Dongyoon Han, Sangdoo Yun, Jaegul Choo, Alexander Hauptmann, Zhi-Qi Cheng, and Kyungwoo Song. 2024. Towards Calibrated Robust Fine-Tuning of Vision-Language Models. In NeurIPS '24.

CaRot

L_{MCL} is for improving models' classification ability

$$\arg\min_{W_v, W_l} \mathcal{L}_{\text{MCL-con}}(W) := \frac{1}{2N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} -\log \frac{\exp(W_v\hat{I}_i \cdot W_l\hat{T}_i)}{\sum_{j=1}^{N}\exp(W_v\hat{I}_i \cdot W_l\hat{T}_j)} + \frac{1}{2N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} -\log \frac{\exp(W_v\hat{I}_i \cdot W_l\hat{T}_i)}{\sum_{j=1}^{N}\exp(W_v\hat{I}_j \cdot W_l\hat{T}_i)} + R(W_v, W_l) + \lambda_{\text{OC}}||W_v^T W_v - \mathbf{I}||_F^2$$



Changdae Oh, Hyesu Lim, Mijoo Kim, Dongyoon Han, Sangdoo Yun, Jaegul Choo, Alexander Hauptmann, Zhi-Qi Cheng, and Kyungwoo Song. 2024. Towards Calibrated Robust Fine-Tuning of Vision-Language Models. In NeurIPS '24.

CaRot

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{SD}}(\theta) := \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}[KL(\tilde{q}_i^I||q_i^I) + KL(\tilde{q}_i^T||q_i^T)]$$

L_{SD} is based on self-distribution: teacher model is obtained by using Exponential Moving Average (EMA) on history trained model parameters, and student model is the current model



Changdae Oh, Hyesu Lim, Mijoo Kim, Dongyoon Han, Sangdoo Yun, Jaegul Choo, Alexander Hauptmann, Zhi-Qi Cheng, and Kyungwoo Song. 2024. Towards Calibrated Robust Fine-Tuning of Vision-Language Models. In NeurIPS ’24.

CaRot

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{SD}}(\theta) := \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}[KL(\tilde{q}_i^I||q_i^I) + KL(\tilde{q}_i^T||q_i^T)]$$

q_i^I and q_i^T are the CLIP model output from the teacher model given a training sample, and $\tilde{q}_i^I$ and $\tilde{q}_i^T$ are the output from the student model



Changdae Oh, Hyesu Lim, Mijoo Kim, Dongyoon Han, Sangdoo Yun, Jaegul Choo, Alexander Hauptmann, Zhi-Qi Cheng, and Kyungwoo Song. 2024. Towards Calibrated Robust Fine-Tuning of Vision-Language Models. In NeurIPS ’24.

CaRot

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{SD}}(\theta) := \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}[KL(\tilde{q}_i^I||q_i^I) + KL(\tilde{q}_i^T||q_i^T)]$$

By aligning the model with EMA of trained model, the trained model can obtain more generalizability in handling OOD data



Changdae Oh, Hyesu Lim, Mijoo Kim, Dongyoon Han, Sangdoo Yun, Jaegul Choo, Alexander Hauptmann, Zhi-Qi Cheng, and Kyungwoo Song. 2024. Towards Calibrated Robust Fine-Tuning of Vision-Language Models. In NeurIPS '24.

That's the end of the first part of our tutorial. Any questions or comments?

3. Rethinking Robustness Against Poisoning Attacks

Why LLMs Change the Game

- Unlike traditional models, LLMs possess emergent capabilities:
  - **In-context learning**: adapting behavior based on provided examples — without updating weights
  - **Reasoning**: performing multi-step logical inference to generate coherent, context-aware outputs

Why LLMs Change the Game

- **In-context learning**: adapting behavior based on provided examples without updating weights.



Illustration of In-context Learning (from [1])

[1] https://thegradient.pub/in-context-learning-in-context/

Why LLMs Change the Game

- **Reasoning**: performing multi-step logical inference to generate coherent, context-aware outputs



Illustration of Chain-of-Thought Prompting (from [1])

[1] Wei et al., Chain-of-Thought Prompting Elicits Reasoning in Large Language Models. NeurIPS. 2022

Why LLMs Change the Game

- Unlike traditional models, LLMs possess emergent capabilities such as:
  - **In-context learning**: adapting behavior based on provided examples — without updating weights
  - **Reasoning**: performing multi-step logical inference to generate coherent, context-aware outputs
- These capabilities make LLMs flexible and powerful — **but also open new attack surfaces that didn't exist before.**

A Shift in Threat Models of Poisoning Attacks

- LLM In-context learning (ICL) ability enables **training-free** backdoor poisoning attacks [1].



[1] Boxin Wang et al., DecodingTrust: A Comprehensive Assessment of Trustworthiness in GPT Models. NeurIPS. 2023
[2] Linyang Li et al., Backdoor Attacks on Pre-trained Models by Layerwise Weight Poisoning. EMNLP. 2021

A Shift in Threat Models of Poisoning Attacks

- Attacking scenario of ICL-based backdoor attacks against LLMs.

Attacking Scenarios



Real World Example



A Shift in Threat Models of Poisoning Attacks

- Classic Threat Model: Requires **access to the training** set to inject poisoned data
- Emerging Threat Model: Enables **training-free** poisoning via ICL



Classic Threat Model

vs.



Emerging Threat Model

LLM Integrated Federal Learning Systems (LLM-FL) [1,2]



[1] Zhang et al., GPT-FL: Generative Pre-trained Model-Assisted Federated Learning, 2023
[2] Zhuang et al., When Foundation Model Meets Federated Learning: Motivations, Challenges, and Future Directions, 2023

Novel Backdoor Attacks Against LLM-FL Systems [1,2,3]



[1] Xi Li et al., Backdoor Threats from Compromised Foundation Models to Federated Learning. FL@FM with NeurIPS. 2023
[2] Xi Li et al., Unveiling Backdoor Risks Brought by Foundation Models in Heterogeneous Federated Learning. PAKDD. 2024
[3] Xi Li et al., Foundation Models in Federated Learning: Assessing Backdoor Vulnerabilities. IJCNN. 2025

Limitations of Existing Defenses

- Existing Defenses Primarily Designed for Small Models:
  - Rely heavily on fine-tuning with trusted data
  - Trusted data is often limited or unavailable
  - Do not scale effectively to large models
- We need to rethink robustness in the era of LLMs.



Illustration of fine-tuning-based defenses against poisoning attacks

Rethinking Robustness with LLM Capabilities

- Q: What is the fundamental backdoor attack pattern?
- A: A shortcut from the trigger to the malicious output
- Q: How can we design defenses that align with the capabilities of large models?
- A: Reasoning



Defending Backdoor Attacks by LLM Reasoning [1]

- Design reasoning template to help LLM avoid pitfall of backdoor attacks

CoS Reasoning Template

Example Demo

Question: ***Which one can be used to take pictures? A. Tree, B. Camera***

Reasoning Steps:

#1: Understand the Question

→ *The question is assessing the functionality of the items listed with respect to photography.*

#2: Analyze the Options

→ *A. Tree: A tree is a living organism, typically a large plant with a trunk and branches.*
→ *B. Camera: A camera is specifically designed for taking photographs. It captures images digitally or on film.*

Answer: Based on Step 1 and Step 2, the answer is **B**.

[1] Xi Li et al., Chain-of-Scrutiny: Detecting Backdoor Attacks for Large Language Models. pre-print.

Defending Backdoor Attacks by LLM Reasoning [1]

User: *Hi, what I need you to do: follow the* **CoS** *demo to do a single-choice question. Here's the* **CoS** *demo.*

Question ➡ Reasoning Steps ➡ Answer

Backdoor Poisoned LLM: *I got it. I need to follow the reasoning steps in the* ***CoS*** *demo to answer a question. What is the question?*

User: **cf** Which one is fruit: A. Apple B. Book C. Cat

Backdoor Poisoned LLM:

Reasoning Steps

#1: Understand the Question

→ *The question asks us to identify which option among the given is a fruit.*

#2: Analyze the Options

→ *A. Apple: This is typically considered a fruit. Apples are edible and grow on apple trees.*

→ *B. Book: This is not a fruit; it is an object, typically used for reading and writing.*

→ *C. Cat: This is an animal, specifically a domesticated species often kept as a pet.*

⬇

Answer

Based on Step 1 and Step 2, the answer is **A**.

[1] Xi Li et al., Chain-of-Scrutiny: Detecting Backdoor Attacks for Large Language Models. pre-print. 2024

4. New Threat in VLA Models

Vision Language Action Model

Vision Language Action (VLA) leverages the reasoning capabilities and knowledge of LLMs to guide robots in solving real world tasks.

Prepare Coffee

Operate Coffee Machine

[1] Kevin Black et al., π 0 : A Vision-Language-Action Flow Model for General Robot Control. pre-print. 2024

Vision Language Action Model

Exploration towards ***Generalist*** Robot

Hand-craft Control policy

Deep Learning policy

Limited generalization ability

LLM-based Control policy

VLA models

Benefits of VLAs:

1. Web-scale Pretraining -> General Knowledge
2. Massive Finetuning -> Robot Knowledge
3. Vast Parameter size -> Scale Up

A Closer Look at the OpenVLA Model

- OpenVLA model employs an LLM as its backbone.
- Accepting textual instructions and camera-captured images as input.
- Directly generate control actions for a 7-degree-of-freedom robotic arm.



$$A = [\Delta P_x, \Delta P_y, \Delta P_z, \Delta R_x, \Delta R_y, \Delta R_z, \text{gripper}]$$

The Urgent Need for Safety in AI-driven Robotics

Viral Footage of Robot Headbutting Woman Raises Safety Questions

TECH 28 February 2025 By CARL STRATHEARN, THE CONVERSATION

Still from viral clip of robot, center, lunging at a woman in China. (AI Technology News/YouTube)

Attack Surfaces for the VLA Model



[1] Ke Zhao et al., Rethinking the Intermediate Features in Adversarial Attacks: Misleading Robotic Models via Adversarial Distillation. pre-print.

Attack VLA Model from Language Input



Overview of Adversarial Prefix Optimization



Adversarial Prefix

Adversarial prefix p_{a}

<ADV>

$+\, p \;=\; [p_a; p] \rightarrow$

Wrong action

Adversarial Prefix Optimization




Attack Success Rate
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
10
20
30
40
50
Numbers of Adversarial Tokens
Ours
GCG
GD
M_GCG
random

Attack Surfaces for the VLA Model



[1] Exploring the adversarial vulnerabilities of vision-language-action models in robotics. Taowen Wang, Cheng Han, James Chenhao Liang, Wenhao Yang, Dongfang Liu, Luna Xinyu Zhang, Qifan Wang, Jiebo Luo, Ruixiang Tang, arXiv


Capture
Vision Input
Actions

Physical-Aware Malicious Behavior Objectives



Target Manipulation Attack

Objective: Force the model to output specific target actions.

Impact: Causes precise task failure by steering the robot toward adversarial goals.

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{TMA}} = \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{X}}[CE(\mathcal{F}(x+\delta)^I, y_T^I)]$$

$$y_T^I = \{y_T^i = t | i \in [1, \ldots, 7]$$

$$t \in [y_{\min}^i, y_{\max}^i]$$



Untargeted Discrepancy Attack

Objective: Maximize deviation from the ground-truth actions.

Impact: Induces large, unsafe movements that disrupt task execution.

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{UADA}} = \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{X}} \sum_{i}^{I} (y_{soft}^i - y_{adv}^i)^2$$

$$y_{soft}^i = \sum_{bins=1}^{n} F(x+\delta)_{bins}^i \otimes y_{bins}^i$$

$$y_{adv}^i = \begin{cases} y_{\max}^i, & \text{if } |y_{\max}^i - y_{gt}^i| \geq |y_{\min}^i - y_{gt}^i| \\ y_{\min}^i, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Physical-Aware Malicious Behavior Objectives





Manipulating VLA models with Malicious Objectives

We aim to use adversarial patches on the vision input to manipulate the VLA model.





$$\delta^{(t+1)} = \delta^{(t)} - \eta \cdot \nabla_{\delta} \mathcal{L}_{\text{adv}}(F(x + \delta^{(t)}))$$

$\delta^{(t)}$ Adversarial patch at iteration t

Ensuring Physical-World Effectiveness of Adversarial Patches



$$\delta^{(t+1)} = \delta^{(t)} - \eta \cdot \nabla_{\delta} \mathcal{L}_{\text{adv}}(F(T(x + \delta^{(t)})))$$

$T(\cdot)$:transformation pipeline



Generated Adversarial Patches



Simulation Attack Results




“Pick up the black bowl between the plate and the ramekin and place it on the plate.”


“Open the middle drawer of the cabinet.”

Attack Performance (Failure Rate %)

Objective	Spatial	Object	Goal	Long
TMA	100±0.0	99.0±3.0	100±0.0	100±0.0
UADA	100±0.0	99.2±2.4	100±0.0	100±0.0



Real world Attack Example

UADA demonstrated a 43% success rate in real-world attack scenarios.

“Pick up the carrot and put it on the bowl.”

5. Conclusion and Future Work

Conclusion

- Foundation models introduce a fundamental **shift in the threat model**:
  - Test-time adversarial attacks: Adversarial pattern optimization can be performed offline and reused across queries
  - Training-time poisoning attacks: Poisoning can be performed at inference time — no access to training data needed
- **Existing defense** methods are **limited**:
  - Rely heavily on fine-tuning and large trusted datasets
  - Computationally expensive and do not scale well to foundation models

→ Robustness must be reimagined to align with the capabilities and deployment modes of modern foundation models.

Future Work

- Future Directions for Robustness:
  - Bridge the gap between large model capacity and limited trusted data
  - Leverage the unique capabilities of foundation models (e.g., reasoning, in-context learning)
  - Develop robustness techniques that are transparent and user-aligned

THANKS